We move in this article from discussing the conceptual and empirical issues that commonly frame research into the credit card industry to detailed evidence of the cross-border growth of credit cards in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Our final section evaluates this evidence for future studies of the globalization of retail financial markets.
Embedding Two-Sided Markets in Their Historical Context
Studies on payment platforms, including credit cards, often rely on a conceptual framework known as two-sided markets. 1 The genesis of this research agenda was validated by exploring the credit card industry in the United States. 2 Its logic runs in the following way: payment card transactions occur in a market involving several players, namely, retail consumers (i.e., cardholders) and their banks (issuers), merchants and their banks (acquirers). A network operator or platform coordinates and sets rules for the participants so that two sets of end users (customers and merchants) interact simultaneously.
Anyone can issue plastic money, but its success depends on acceptance. 3 In other words, the payment card scheme that signs up the greatest number of cardholders and merchants will dominate. The irreconcilable aims of the demand and supply sides of the market characterize so-called two-sided markets and, hence, their novel formalization of codetermined prices and network externalities between at least two distinct groups of users, typically cardholders and merchants.
Contributors to the two-sided market research agenda point to the serious error that antitrust analysis incurs if it fails to account for the consequences of the two groups' interlinking demands. 4 According to Jonathan Williams, however, empirical evidence for two-sided markets is rare and inconclusive. 5 Yet this has not deterred others from using the two-sided market framework to explore the competitive dynamics of retail payments. 6 These studies, however, have been instigated mostly by regulatory and antitrust concerns. They ignore the sunk costs of building the retail payment infrastructure. They also forget that when paying with plastic, fees and other costs inhibit parity of value in the exchange of goods and services for money. 7 In our view, therefore, the double-sided market narrative considers the exchange of value only once the market has formed and stabilized. This suggests scanty understanding of the physical, technological, and organizational infrastructure that today's retail payments ecosystem demands. 8 The preconditions for the functioning of these markets, which are often assumed, remain unexplored. Our research, however, suggests that a historical exploration of these preconditions can complement other studies and help us to better understand the long-term functioning of the retail payment market. This article thus joins others in questioning the tendency toward direct explanation from economic theory, seeking to clarify the possible long-term impact from the initial conditions for the adoption of specific technologies and industry configuration. 9 The Dawn of the Bank Credit Card Business Model Pioneers in the United States. The history of credit cards in the United States, in its several stages, is intimately linked to changes in consumption habits. 10 There is some agreement in locating its roots in the installment credit programs to finance large purchases that became popular between the wars, while in the late 1940s charge cards and roll-over credit widened in popularity. 11 Retailers would typically sell at one price for cash and a higher price for credit. Proprietary or cooperative card agreements were offered by retailers to increase sales and loyalty, but not to make profit per se. 12 The new travel and entertainment (T&E) cards, which allowed noncash on-the-spot payments to many retailers, differed from previous charge cards by being exclusively profitmaking. T&E cards for the Diners Club (from 1950) spread to Mexico in 1953 and Spain in 1957; American Express (from 1958) followed in 1959 and 1963, respectively. 13 In response, some banks competed with the large retailers by issuing their own charge account cards. 14 Like T&E cards, these had no revolving credit and were payable in full. Several U.S. banks tried to introduce charge account programs in the 1940s and 1950s but failed because of high start-up and operational costs; only twenty-seven of the hundred or so U.S. schemes launched after 1947 were still viable in 1958. 15 New England bankers' adoption of charge cards was noted as "intentionally . . . cautious." 16 But the actual reason for their failure was that legal limits on banks' geographical growth ensured the collapse of charge card projects before they could reach critical mass. Indeed, the few bank charge account schemes that were successful in the late 1950s all limited their credit to small and medium-sized local retailers. In this regard, new research has challenged perceived wisdom in reevaluating the importance of charge accounts for U.S. banks' adoption of credit card programs. 17 At the end of 1963, one estimate placed the U.S. consumer credit market at $69.89 billion of which $22.20 billion (32 percent) was reserved for automobiles and only $5.87 billion (8 percent) for charge cards-the latter figure comprised $4.46 billion to diverse retail stores, $895 million to department stores, and $520 million to bank charge cards. 18 This was to change by 1970, when large U.S. banks ventured into credit cards. Some-notably Bank of America, based in San Francisco, and the network built around Interbank-had been successful, but not all-chiefly Chase Manhattan and the First National City Bank (today Citibank), both based in New York City. 19 Although Citibank's project lasted many years, like Chase, it eventually forwent going at it alone and joined MasterCard.
Two "national interchange credit card plan[s]" were born in the 1960s and built around two different business models: BankAmericard (Visa International from 1977) and Interbank (named MasterCharge in 1969 and MasterCard from 1979). 20 National interchange meant the advent of a bank credit card plan covering the United States after almost twenty years of fragmented experiments around regional, local, or single-bank charge card plans. 21 Fragmentation helped with franchising in that member banks would not, at least initially, compete with one another. It also meant that bank credit cards remained a local solution until the 1980s.
The pioneering credit card scheme of Bank of America had to overcome the operational shortcomings and negative attitudes of other banks toward charge accounts. It allowed, among other things, economies of scale and widespread consumer adoption by creditworthy consumers, while rivaling revolving credit offerings by large department stores and overcoming consumer perception that credit was a working-class expedient. It also revealed the benefits of franchising to uninitiated and skeptical bankers, linked unfamiliar consumer credit to established banking practices, dealt with state restrictions on the interest rates on consumer loans chargeable by local banks, and advised merchants on sales promotion and the purchasing of equipment.
The long-term success of the bank credit card is manifest. 22 Aggregate data also corroborate the increased use of bank credit cards following the establishment of BankAmericard (Visa) and Interbank (MasterCard). In 1967, bank-backed credit cards in the United States granted $820 million in credit; this amount grew to $4.4 billion in 1971 and to $9.1 billion in 1975. Figure 1 illustrates the growth of credit card activity in the United States between 1970 and 1978. Interestingly, in this period, accounts grew 355 percent, sales using bank-backed credit cards increased 633 percent, and credit granted using them grew 533 percent. These magnitudes suggest that greater growth occurred in the intensification of activity (i.e., the use of the card) than in the number of accounts. These data also show delinquency declining during this period, implying some form of organizational learning and more resilient systems in awarding credit (despite the mass mailing of "live" cards). 23 Developments in the United Kingdom. Financial intermediaries working in British retail banking markets have experienced sustained and continuous change. 24 By 1911, a process of amalgamation left some 80 percent of deposits in the hands of five banks: Midland, Barclays, Lloyds, Westminster, and National Provincial. These, plus some six others, controlled access to the check clearing system, hence the 22 Wolters, "'Carry Your Credit,'" 317. 23 For an opposite assessment arguing that the growth of the credit card accompanies significant increases in delinquent accounts, see Sean H. name "clearing banks." 25 Amalgamations also had the effect of providing clearing banks with a national web of offices and retail bank branches. 26 By the 1960s, Barclays was the largest clearing bank in terms of total assets, spearheading international diversification and the adoption of computer technology. 27 As the case of the credit cards shows, Barclays was also a trailblazer, bringing new products and services to the mass retail finance market in Britain.
British consumers had access to charge cards before the advent of the bank credit card, but as late as 1971 there was "no statistic available on [charge cards] or information on the trades and their issuers. They [were] it appears more in the catering trades than in the retailing of goods." 28 In other words, charge cards in the United Kingdom were largely T&E cards. 29 The first T&E card in Britain was launched in 1951 when Finders' Services, a company offering support to professionals, diversified into this market. 30 Although a number of events had kept British banks outside the mortgage market, they were (directly) involved in consumer credit through a small amount of personal loans and (indirectly) through open market operations that secured wholesale funding to hire purchase companies. In this context, a pivotal event was Barclays' launch of its credit card with the support of Bank of America in 1966. It is not clear whether the British approached the Californians or vice versa. 34 The fact remains that Barclays was the first U.K. bank to embrace the full potential of credit cards, while Bank of America saw the agreement with Barclays as a chance to license its credit card system and expand abroad.
46 Barclays' balance sheet was smaller than the American bank in assets but not in numbers of branches. Barclays employed 54,905 people domestically, and it had 3,215 branches in the United Kingdom (mostly in England and Wales), representing 65 percent of Barclays' total and 23 percent of all British bank branches. 35 When Barclays negotiated an exclusive franchise from Bank of America at the end of 1965, a small team was set up to plan a U.K. 28 40 But soon after, they changed their minds. In 1970 these same banks appointed a working group to produce an alternative to Barclaycard, branded Access, which materialized in 1972 under the aegis of the newly named MasterCharge. 41 British credit cards were thus firmly based on U.S. predecessors.
Adoption in Mexico.
Mexico and Spain also provide exemplary stories of the process of adopting bank credit cards. At the time, both countries had enjoyed a period of sustained economic growth, when 36 Before 1977, international credit cards carried unique names such as Chargex in Canada, Carte Blue in France, and Sumitomo Card in Japan. 37 As with merchants, data on the size of the consumer base would also be prone to exaggeration. This is evident in the internal data of inactive cards. Double counting of subsidiary cards (i.e., more than one card per household) was not so much of an issue, at least in Spain and Mexico, where card companies targeted male heads of family. Evidence of delinquent cards at the Banco de Bilbao suggests there were two to four females per every one hundred cardholders. These data should also be taken with care, because the methodology for identifying and completing case studies for delinquent cards is unknown. "Análisis estadistico pasados a mora," box 355, binder 2, subfolder 1, Archivo Histórico BBVA, Bilbao (hereafter, AHBBVA their banking systems had expanded. A rapid increase in the urban population of both countries also contributed to the retail banking environment. 42 In Mexico, the sum of commercial banks' assets totaled 16.5 percent of GDP in 1959, rising to 32 percent of GDP in 1970. It was a relatively stable and profitable industry. The four largest banks accounted for 50 percent of the country's bank loans and only the two largest banks had a meaningful national presence. About ninety other, mostly regional, banks accounted for the other half of the country's bank loans. Banking laws in Mexico prohibited the operation of foreign banks (except for Citibank). However, some banks had international financial intermediaries or individual foreign residents as shareholders. The larger banks also had financial relationships with international banks, as well as representation in financial centers in several countries. 43 Between 1950 and 1970, Mexican retail banks implemented a policy to deliver their services to a mass market, largely in response to the growth of cities and the urban middle class. In 1965, when the biggest banks in terms of assets brought in their first computers, digitized operation started. 44 This move paved the way for credit cards.
The bank credit card was introduced earlier in Mexico than in other Latin American countries; the first in the region came in January 1968 from Banco Nacional de México (Banamex), then the largest Mexican bank in terms of assets. 45 The card was branded Bancomatico and affiliated with the Interbank system. 46 In June 1969, its main rival, Banco de Comercio (Bancomer), then the second-largest Mexican bank, launched 42 In 1960, 50.7 percent of the population of Mexico was urban, 56.6 percent in Spain, and 69.9 percent in the United States, whereas in the United Kingdom it was 78.5 percent. World Bank, "Population, Total," The Spanish market for payment cards. During the 1960s, the Spanish banking industry increased its penetration in the economy, from 53 percent in 1960 to 75 percent in 1970, measured as the ratio of deposits of banks and savings banks to GDP. 49 50 The Spanish financial system was operated chiefly by domestic institutions, many having business links with international banks.
Launched in December 1970, Eurocard, Banco de Vizcaya's MasterCharge-backed scheme, was Spain's first credit card. In June 1971, the other bank of importance in the region, Banco de Bilbao, launched its credit card, based on BankAmericard. 51 banks. 52 This network extended across every province and provincial capital, giving the bank access to a potential market comprising 84 percent of the country's whole population and 88 percent of total income.
The early performance of Vizcaya's Eurocard was mediocre. For instance, at the end of 1972, the card was accepted by 17,000 merchants and carried by 18,000 cardholders, while its rival had 18,000 merchants and 360,000 cardholders. 53 Eurocard did no better over the next ten years; in spite of Vizcaya's pioneering advantage, the Bilbao's card dominated the market.
By 1980, the Bilbao and other small Spanish banks had 2.3 million Visa cards in circulation, with annual turnover of 28 billion pesetas. 54 Meanwhile, MasterCharge took hold in Spain when Banca Catalana and fifteen small regional banks formed the Agrupación Española de Tarjetas de Crédito in 1975. 55 In 1980, MasterCard had 250,000 cardholders and 3 billion pesetas in turnover, while Vizcaya's Eurocard had 100,000 cardholders and 4 billion pesetas in turnover. 56 Assembling the Parts: A Two-Sided Market Yet to Come However, it offered the possibility of displacing cash by inserting banks between merchants and card users during exchanges of value. This opened an opportunity for fee income generation. Admittedly, in the 1960s fee income was a minor item of most retail banks' profit and loss, but the introduction of the credit card should be seen as part of a broader move beginning in the late 1950s to diversify banks' product offerings in western Europe and North America.
Although the credit card project worked well for many banks, the process of adoption was not uneventful. For instance, the boards of Barclays in the United Kingdom and of Banamex in Mexico fully supported the idea. In Spain, however, the then managing director (later CEO) of the Bilbao, José Ángel Sánchez Asiaín, had to threaten resignation before the board would approve the project. 58 In Mexico, Manuel Espinosa Yglesias, Bancomer's CEO and president, was not convinced even in 1969 of its soundness; however, competitive pressure from Banamex's innovation forced Bancomer to respond. 59 Table 1 summarizes the state of play in four competitive environments when financial institutions first launched their cards. Evidence suggests that customers, regulators, and banks knew something of payment cards through their experience of indigenous T&E cards and through efforts by American Express and Diners Club to build crossborder payment platforms.
As mentioned, foreign licensees replicated the business and organizational models of the U.S. banks. For example, unlike the international norm hitherto, Bank of America and each foreign adopter of BankAmericard and Interbank set up a card organization that was always a subsidiary, that is, an organization focused on credit card operations, semidetached from the main bank but consolidating its financial results. This move not only limited the possible credit exposure of the parent company to the capital of the subsidiary, but further suggested that the credit card project had to be profitable in its own right. 60 Banks sent staff to the United States, especially California, to observe firsthand the workings of U.S. banks. 61 We also found frequent, Gieser, "Motives and Models of Credit Card Use" (master's thesis, University of Southern California, 1989); Zumello, "The 'Everything Card,'" 554. 58 multilateral, and intense exchange of ideas among executives of the growing international licensees of BankAmericard. These took shape in many forms, including letters and annual and semiannual meetings, as well as sharing of newsworthy articles sourced in English-language newspapers and magazines such as the Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, and The Economist. The latter were often translated into Spanish (or English) in order to have a wide internal readership at the recipients' bank. In Britain, Barclays immediately invested in a dedicated computer system to support credit card operations, while in Spain Banco de Bilbao's first computer served the same purpose-these at a time when most western European banks were adopting computer technology to support check clearing and accounting functions such as payroll. 62 Meanwhile in Mexico, in a show of modernity, Banamex leveraged the introduction of its credit card by giving it the same name as its computer center, established in 1966: Bancomatico. Before signing up with Interbank, Banamex had tried to introduce an established U.S. credit card scheme. Hence, Banamex staff had negotiated with major banks in New York City, specifically Chase Manhattan and First National City Bank (today Citibank) as well as Bank of America in California. However, Banamex considered the payment demanded for a brand name, know-how, and opportunities for international clearing too high; instead, it formed a loose alliance with Interbank while developing computer systems in-house with the cooperation of external IT consultants. 63 Typically, foreign banks adopted the BankAmericard in exclusivity for their country. This exclusivity turned out to be significant in making Banco de Bilbao and Barclays the single biggest acquirers in their growing domestic credit card market for the next two decades. 64 Exclusivity also brought competitive responses from other domestic banks joining Interbank-which encouraged the formation of locally shared licenses, creating very different incentives for interbank cooperation, together with different organizational hierarchies linking member banks. 65 The bank-issued credit card unquestionably marks a turning point in retail payments. Most countries observed an explosion in the number of new domestic entrants into "paying with plastic" following widespread signing up to either BankAmericard or Interbank.
The introduction in Mexico of a third bank credit card, amid competition between Banamex and Bancomer, is another example of multiple entrants jockeying for position. Ten Mexican banks jointly established Promoción y Operación S.A. (Prosa) in August 1969 to coordinate the launch and operation of a third credit card scheme, Carnet, supplementing those of Banamex and Bancomer. Although a couple of the banks behind Prosa operated nationwide retail branch networks, their directors could not guarantee sufficient business volume to move independently into credit cards and thus joined forces in order to meet the sunk costs of the system. Interestingly, records show that Banamex helped to set up Prosa and develop its computer system. This action suggests that after Bancomer brought the BankAmericard to Mexico, Banamex followed a "divide and conquer" policy. Although the banks behind Carnet generated enough business volume for their card scheme to remain viable for decades afterward, Carnet was accepted only in Mexico, Cuba, and a couple of Central American countries. Consequently, it remained a proprietary network, never challenging the global ambitions of BankAmericard or Interbank.
Table 1 also shows that the Bilbao's competitors in Spain in the early 1970s included Banco de Vizcaya's Eurocard/MasterCharge; the savings banks' consortium Tarjeta 6000; Banca Catalana's consortium MasterCharge card; and Banco Industrial y Mercantil's Unicuenta. These coexisted with check guarantee cards (Eurocheque and Tarjeta 4B) and such T&E cards as American Express, Diners Club, Telelibre (issued by the state telephone monopoly Telefónica), and Melia Club (issued by travel group Melia with financial support from Banco Coca). State-owned gas stations and highway tolls refused the Bilbao card, unwilling to pay the high fees. Some department stores, for example, Sears and El Corte Inglés, had their own cards. But given the early acceptance of the Bilbao card by the El Corte Inglés and its large network of stores across Spain, other large retailers (such as Galerias Preciado) and smaller merchants began to accept the Bilbao's card. 66 The early move of the Bilbao into credit cards was remarkable, considering the highly conservative environment that otherwise characterized Spain in the late stages of Franco's regime. In fact, Bank of America had Banco de Santander as its main partner and correspondent there. However, this and other large Spanish banks showed no interest in inaugurating a credit card. 67 Soon after, Santander and the biggest Spanish bank at that time, Banco Español de Crédito (Banesto), for reasons that are unclear, attempted, albeit in vain, to persuade the Bilbao to share the franchise of BankAmericard in Spain, apparently with support from Bank of America. Instead, Santander joined Banesto and the two other biggest Spanish banks (Central and Hispanoamericano) to launch a check guarantee card in 1974 (branded Tarjeta 4B), hoping that personal checks rather than credit cards were the future. 68 Unfortunately, personal checks failed to generate significant business volume in Spain. Consequently, the banks behind the 4B brand turned their card into a proper credit card in 1979 and joined the newly created Visa Spain (while at the same time using their card to activate their new ATM network). 69 Spanish and Mexican regulators appeared indifferent to the credit card project, whereas the United States had passed regulations following problems relating to fraud and mounting losses at Illinois banks stemming from the mass mailing of unsolicited "live" cards. The hearings around the Truth in Lending Act (1968) exposed such practices and generated momentum for their prohibition in 1970. These hearings also introduced cardholders' limited liability for lost and stolen credit cards. 70 Similar debates developed in the United Kingdom. The initial concern in Britain was to limit the growth of credit card schemes allowing foreign cash withdrawals to circumvent currency controls. Credit cards later figured in the internal British debate about the effects of personal credit on inflation and informed the passing of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (which, to bankers' displeasure, introduced the annual 67 José Victor Arroyo Martín, "Los origenes de la tarjeta de crédito bancaria en España, 1970 España, -1980 España, ," 2006 Customer Selection as the Foundation of a Global Network Domestic roots of global retail payments. Credit cards issued by retail banks emerged alongside such innovations as check guarantee cards, personal loans, hire purchase (installment credit), overdrafts, travelers' checks, early forms of electronic transfer, and cash dispensers. The successful implementation of many of these innovations marked the transformation from extolling savings and frugality to encouraging debt and consumerism. 71 Explicit in research by David L. Stearns, and implicit in a contemporary view by Kenneth V. Larkin, an executive at Bank of America, is that marketers realized the value of access to a large middle-class customer base, brand awareness, and banking relationships with merchants (preceding credit cards) as factors that help to explain the long-term success of bank-issued credit cards. 72 To give an idea of difference between target markets, consider that in 1966 American Express issued cards to people earning at least £2,000 per year in the United Kingdom and $7,500 in the United States. At the time, the average income per capita was $4,146.30 in the United States and £2,032.11 (or $1,959.60) in the United Kingdom. 73 Credit limits of Barclaycard in 1972 oscillated between £50 and £200 according to individual circumstances (businessmen would typically get higher limits). Individuals using a Barclaycard could withdraw up to £100 at a branch of Barclays (approximately £1,500, or $2,000, in 2017). 74 At the same time, a check guarantee card from any other English bank would allow up to £30 cash withdrawal per check, while banks limited cash machines to £10 per withdrawal (and some banks restricted customers to two withdrawals per month).
Like Banamex, Bancomer had built a large network of retail bank branches in Mexican cities. 80 As mentioned, presence in urban centers was essential for selecting and recruiting cardholders and retailers and the consequent success of the card.
Although the top echelons of Bancomer were initially skeptical about the credit card project, once committed, the bank pursued an aggressive marketing strategy to create awareness among individuals and business. There is little archival information on Bancomer's methods of selecting cardholders. But between 1969 and 1970 its marketing campaign included an alliance with the Mexican subsidiary of Reader's Digest, offering a free subscription to the magazine to each new cardholder. 81 Bancomer initially had fewer than 17,000 establishments affiliated in 1969. By the end of 1970, it had 24,000, which by 1973 had risen to 34,774. The number of cardholders increased from 217,000 in 1970 to 274,000 in 1974. 82 The formation of IBANCO. The next step in building a global network was to form two international hubs. Surviving business records allowed us to explore IBANCO, later Visa International. This part of the story took place around 1974.
interchange fee paid by the issuing bank for allowing its customers access to foreign cash.
Clearly the future of cross-border growth was bleak, while the cost of setting and managing bilateral agreements threatened to spiral out of control. International member banks thus pressed Ernest J. Young, president of the Bank of America Service Corporation, to form a "universal credit card company." 87 But Young was reluctant to form a coordinating organization for Europe analogous to NBI for domestic affiliated banks. However, international banks had the support of Dee Hock, president of NBI, and other directors at Bank of America (including Bruce Marcus). Finally Bank of America gave in to licensee pressure, but only after heavyweight participants such as Barclays threatened to leave the system. 88 IBANCO, the umbrella organization that would set rules for international licensees of the BankAmericard system, incorporated in September 1974. This organization was to be modeled on NBI, including the method of formulating the interchange fee. 89 International licensees agreed to allow other banks to act as merchants and issue BankAmericards in their countries (but many, such as the Bilbao and Barclays, remained the sole acquirer). The bylaws of the new organization also allowed for "duality," that is, for merchant banks to participate in competing credit card systems. 90 
Conclusion
The formation of the global bank credit card industry relied on strong domestic players, all of which had large distribution networks and longstanding relationships with individual customers and retailers. The combination of a critical mass of users with the capacity to adopt and implement technological change and international collaboration explains the ascent of "paying with plastic."
Context-specific strategies played a role in the evolving formation of its network. For instance, few writers doubt that mass mailings of unsolicited cards played an important role in establishing the bank credit card market. However, its unbridled use, resulting in significant losses, rising delinquency, and adverse regulation, led contemporary bankers to be cautious.
The so-called "non-discrimination clause" through which credit card companies forced retailers to offer the same price for goods and services regardless of payment medium was another contributory factor. Most countries retained this practice until relatively recently. The "nondiscrimination clause" calls into question the assumption that paying with cash has no transaction cost. Moreover, it hides the fact that the business model behind the credit card is aimed not only at generating interest income from roll-over credit, but also at making a bank the intermediary between individuals and retailers, thus introducing a "toll" in the transfer of value.
The check guarantee card is another noteworthy example of a "toll" in the "payments railway" that serves to highlight the competitive aspects of retail payments. This alternative form of plastic payment offered bankers (and potentially customers and retailers) a viable alternative technology to the credit card. During the 1960s, some attempts were made to introduce check guarantee cards in the United States. But merchants were reluctant to accept payment from banks they did not know; soon afterwards the credit card became the de facto check guarantee card, as it remains.
112 However, check guarantee cards were deployed under the Eurocheque initiative in several western European countries, notably Germany and the United Kingdom.
In the 1960s and early 1970s all major British banks deployed both check guarantee and credit cards. During this process Barclays cannily succeeded in having Barclaycards accepted as single plastic token that could be used both as a credit card and to guarantee checks. Of equal interest is the Tarjeta 4B check guarantee card in Spain, where personal checks were insignificant before 1970. At the heart of this business model was a deliberate attempt to introduce a "toll" in the transfer of value by making a bank the intermediary between individuals and merchants. Meanwhile, there was, to the best of our knowledge, no attempt to introduce a check guarantee card in Mexico between 1950 and 1975.
In summary, our research explains the formation of what is considered a two-sided market. For this, historical research was indispensable. This article posits the view that the dominant approach to envisioning payment industries-that is, a framework based on the literature of two-sided markets-fails to consider the formation of the market and, therefore, may require refinement for the study of emerging technologies within the retail payments space. 91 Nevertheless, we find that the emergence of the credit card serves as an allegory for understanding the effect of fixed costs and critical mass and the way in which these may constitute initial conditions for analyzing market networks.
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